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The Firm Foundation of Organizational Flexibility:
The 360 Contract in the Digitalizing Music Industry
Matt Stahl & Leslie M. Meier
University of Western Ontario
ABSTRACT The devaluation of the recorded music commodity under digitalization has
destabilized the recording industry. One primary record industry response is the new “360
deal” form of the recording contract. By securing rights to individual acts’ live performance,
music publishing and licensing, and merchandizing activities, this new deal expands record
companies’ access to more profitable fields of music industry activity (if in piecemeal fashion).
We examine the context, evolution, and varieties of the 360 deal, and argue that it re-secures
record industry profitability and further stratifies the population of recording artists by shifting
risk onto performers.
KEYWORDS Cultural Industries; Popular Music; Recording Industry; Creative Labour;
Employment Contract; Intellectual Property
RÉSUMÉ La dévaluation marchande de la musique qui accompagne la numérisation a
déstabilisé l’industrie de l’enregistrement sonore en Amérique du nord. Cet article en explore
l’une des principales réponses: le nouveau contrat “360 degrés.” En leur assurant des droits
sur le spectacle vivant, l’édition musicale et les activités reliées aux produits dérivés d’artistes
individuels, ce nouveau contrat élargit l’accès des maisons de disques à des champs d’activité
industrielle plus rentables (même de façon fragmentaire). Nous proposons de rendre compte
du contexte, de l’évolution et de la diversité des contrats 360 degrés, arguant qu’en reléguant
la responsabilité des risques et des investissements aux artistes, l’industrie de l’enregistrement
sonore ré-assure sa rentabilité et polarise davantage la population entre artistes établis et de
la relève, fortifiant la position des premiers et intensifiant la vulnérabilité des seconds.
MOTS CLÉS Les industries culturelles; La musique pop; L’industrie de l’enregistrement
sonore; L’emploi créatif; Le contrat d’emploi; La propriété intellectuel

The fantasy that the music industry is collapsing, disappearing, being
destroyed by [an] army of downloaders is both a basic rock myth and a
mystifying fantasy: the music industry is merely mutating to maintain its
ability to extract surplus value from musical labour, just as it has done for
more than a century. (Keightley, 2010, n.p.)
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God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change [and] an
entertainment lawyer with the clout to change the things he can. …
(Young, 2006, p. 42).

Introduction

F

ar-reaching changes in the North American music industry are affecting the relationships between recording artists and record companies. The digitization of popular music and its unauthorized circulation by users of the Internet have transformed
the recorded music commodity, and systems of accumulation that developed around
its prior forms appear to have been fatally destabilized. The devaluation of the soundcarrier has led to a crisis of monetization in response to which record companies (now
restyling themselves as “music companies”) shift emphasis from the marketing of
recordings to other activities. To replace lost and threatened revenues, companies are
expanding into areas previously largely distinct from record making, underwriting
these efforts through new forms of contractual and institutional relationships with
recording artists.
Our focus in this article is on the emerging standard form of the recording contract
known as the “360 deal” (and increasingly as the “multiple rights deal”) through
which much of this expansion is enabled and whose proliferation is redefining the
politics of recording artistry. The 360 deal is so named because (in its paradigmatic
form) it encircles the contracted artist so that non-record-related activities and revenues formerly beyond the reach of the recording contract become subject to “participation” by the contracting company. These activities and revenues chiefly include
live performance and music publishing and increasingly incorporate the licensing of
names, images, and logos (and the merchandizing of branded items), as well as other,
typically new-media-enabled opportunities for monetization of the artist persona. This
article offers an introduction to the 360 phenomenon; a planned future paper will further explore forms of stratification associated with its institutionalization, as well as
artist and company rhetoric concerning its politics.
Our critical political economy approach is animated by democratic-theoretical
and critical legal studies concerns regarding the politics of employment and contracts
(e.g., Pateman, 1985, 2002; Gaines, 1991). This multidisciplinary frame foregrounds a
crucial relation at the core of the music industry, that between recording artists and
record companies, as a relation between suppliers of creative labour and intellectual
property and the companies who are their employers and the marketers of their products. Furthermore, this perspective embeds a distinction between the closely related
phenomena of exploitation and subordination, helping further to clarify the politics
of creative work in the music industry. Contractual subordination, in this view, is a
precondition of exploitation (Pateman, 1985). Our combined approach highlights the
360 deal as a form of employment contract that creates a relation of subordination (in
which companies are empowered to command and dispossess recording artists) as
the political basis of an economic relation of exploitation (the turning to account of
the labor and products of recording artists by companies). Our principal sources of evidence are American and Canadian trade journals, specialist websites, major newspapers, and Leslie Meier’s field notes from professional and industry conferences in New
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York City in 2010 and 2011, as well as her original interview research. Our examination,
while impelled by this hybrid theoretical frame, considers analyses offered by industry
observers as well as by popular music scholars and scholars and practitioners of entertainment law. We perceive the talent contract to be a basic political-economic fulcrum
of the entertainment industries and aim in this article to outline its current form and
trajectory in the recording industry while identifying the relation of this current form
to its predecessors.
In the midst of an epochal transformation of intra- and inter-organizational relations and dynamics, the dependence of the record industry on firm contractual control
of the creative labour, recorded output, and (star) personae of music makers persists.
Edgar Bronfman, Jr., former head of Warner Music Group, told his company’s investors
in early 2010 that, despite the company’s ongoing diversification, “our business … is
essentially a venture capital business where we’re betting on … unknown artists who
have yet to develop” in terms of their acts and their consumer constituencies (Seeking
Alpha, 2010). Companies’ ability to collect on their “bets” is assured by means of the
contracts that secure their rights to artists’ musical labour and the intellectual properties and revenues associated with those rights. Indeed, writes legal scholar Jonathan
Blaufarb (1983-1984), “[a] record company’s financial status depends on its long-term
contracts with successful artists” (pp. 659–660). By expanding the reach of those contracts to encompass sources of revenue not immediately threatened by the devaluation
of the soundcarrier, this new contract form helps companies to re-secure their ability
to profit from artist popularity, playing a pivotal role in the ongoing transformation of
the record industry.
This article examines the residual and novel features of the emerging talent contracting norms that complement and undergird record companies’ developing digitalization-fueled business strategies. In the second section we summarize some of the
main areas of growth into which record companies seek to expand through the contractual incorporation of 360 components. In the third section we introduce the central
political terms of the late twentieth century recording contract—and a handful of related legal contests—in order to clarify the logics that we see persisting and intensifying
in this process of expansion. In the fourth section we present an account of the development and contours of the 360 deal. Finally, we conclude that the 360 deal is a dynamic legal instrument, rooted in and dependent on longstanding conventions, that
enables companies continually to fortify the contractual foundations of their business
model experimentation.
In this article, our analysis remains largely within the limits of Laing’s (2009) “narrow” definition of the music industry as a “unitary business sector” in which three
“relatively autonomous” subsectors are engaged in “directly producing and disseminating music compositions, recordings and performances” (p. 15, original emphasis).
These three sub-sectors—recording, music publishing, and live performance—have
distinct logics (Hull, 2004; Wikstrom, 2009; Sutherland & Straw, 2007; see also
Williamson & Cloonan, 2007), and have operated with some degree of independence
for nearly a century. The recording subsector, long dependent on the sale of recordings
on grooved discs, magnetic tape, and then digital CDs to music consumers, has been
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a primary centre of gravity, ascending to a dominant position in the postwar period.
In the last decade of the twentieth century and the first of the twenty-first, a number
of factors have reduced the centrality of the recorded music commodity to music industry activity. Most notable among these have been the end of the era of “CD replacement” (by consumers, of CD re-releases of recordings they had already purchased in
vinyl or cassette forms) and the rise of unauthorized sharing of digital music files over
the Internet. These and other factors have altered the balance between these three
main subsectors, initiating a new cycle of change where publishing and live music increasingly appear as sources of profit no longer as decisively tethered to the marketing
or sales of recordings as they had been. Appearing ripe for further capitalization, the
publishing and live music sectors have attracted investors and become sites of accelerating activity. At the same time, formerly more sidelined licensing and merchandizing activities also present expanding opportunities. The 360 deal is a means by which
record companies can capture portions of these markets in piecemeal fashion through
individual artist contracts.
First, the U.S. music publishing sector showed a modest 2% rate of growth from
2005 to 2010; in Canada, the same sector has enjoyed increasing profitability (Ripley,
2010; Statistics Canada 2009). U.S. industry observers project an average growth rate
of 3.2% to 2015 (Ripley, 2010). These rates of growth pale in comparison to those that
fueled waves of record industry consolidation in the latter decades of the twentieth
century (Chapple & Garofalo, 1977; Tschmuck, 2006) but appear increasingly attractive
these days, and waves of consolidation in the publishing sector are already perceptible
(Billboard, 2009). Second, for much of the last ten years, live music has been an area
of “fast” growth (Laing, 2009, p. 19) as music industry capitalists have perceived new
opportunities for investment (see also Holt, 2010). Ticket prices have risen “well above
inflation,” new entrants such as Live Nation and AEG have escalated concentration
and oligopolization, and acts seeking to “buoy themselves against decreasing income
from record sales” (Brennan, 2010, p. 9) are returning to regular live performance.
Third, licensing and merchandizing are of the same logical type as publishing: they
both involve the exploitation of intellectual property rights contractually assigned to
companies by artists. The rapid institutionalization of these formerly more marginal
practices offers expanding opportunities for rights holders to forge music licensing
deals with advertisers (Klein, 2009) and other “brand partners,” including television
and film producers.1 Record companies, “driven by a search for new revenue, not just
economies of scale and higher market share” (Billboard, 2009), have been pursuing
shares of the growth in music publishing, live music, licensing, and “merch” sectors.
Much of this diversification, it appears, is carried out on the backs of artists who,
through 360 deals, become captive clienteles for these services.
A primary theme evident across these changes is the decisive importance of rights
for the recording industry. The significance of Simon Frith’s (1987) insightful perception of a “move from record sales to rights exploitation as the basic source of music
income” (p. 73) is underlined as rights holding and licensing have emerged as the essential conditions for accumulation by the contractors of talent in the new era. In the
360 deal, rights to intellectual property are only one part of the story: rights to per-
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formers’ labour are also fundamental. At the core of the management of rights,
whether over intellectual property or over labour, whether controlled by record companies, live music companies, publishers, or new entrants such as “lifestyle” (e.g., beverage and clothing) brands, is the contract by means of which rights are assigned by
one party to another. To a significant degree, change and experimentation in the music
industry presume the continued stability of “talent relations” (an entertainment industry adaptation of “labour relations”). In other words, as business environments
become increasingly unstable (thanks, for example, to the proliferation of file-sharing
or the entry of new players into the field), companies seek enhanced organizational
flexibility such that they may experiment with new ways of doing business in order
to remain competitive. Yet in the context of destabilization in some areas (e.g., the
waning in steady sales of CDs or the erosion of control over certain markets for music
or music-related commodities), experimentation appears to require a compensating
increase of stability in others, demonstrating an unwillingness to let go of one handhold before securing another. The 360 degree deal helps to assure a stable basis for organizational flexibility by incorporating and securing rights to ever-widening ranges
of artists’ activities and incomes, strengthening and expanding companies’ rights to
command and dispossess artists, and it does so by building on the very sturdy contractual foundations laid in the pre-digital era. The 360 deal’s mix of residual and novel
elements becomes clearer against the backdrop of contracting norms that predominated prior to the onset of contemporary industry reconfiguration.
The North American recording contract takes the form of an “option contract.”
The “option” in option contract signifies “employment at will,” but only at the will of
one party, the employer. In the option contract the employer retains the sole right to
terminate or extend the relationship (by exercising options to renew) and the performer is required to accept a position in which he or she has no control over the duration of the relationship, among other things (see Passman, 2006). The contract is
set up as a series of “option periods” that are linked to the production and release of
sets of recorded tracks (formerly known as “albums”). Each period culminates with
an opportunity for the company either to “drop” the performer or to exercise its next
option to renew the contract. In the latter case, the artist is obliged to record a further
set of tracks, which must be declared satisfactory by the company in order for the obligation to have been met. The nature and the value of the option transform if desired
success and profitability become reality. Until profitability is achieved, the most salient
option for the company is the option to drop the performer; as success and profitability
become more likely, the option to keep the artist by renewing the contract becomes
more valuable. Only the company has options—the performer cannot refuse to be
dropped or refuse to continue recording and promoting without (often) very severe
penalties (Stahl, forthcoming).
With occasional exceptions involving artists bearing extraordinary bargaining
power, there are terms that are simply not on the table in record contract negotiations.
Some of these—exclusivity, assignment and duration—entail control of artists’ labour:
Companies typically require that the contract secures for them: (a) the exclusive right
to the performer’s labour and output, (b) the right to sell or assign the contract to a
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third party (such as the purchaser of the company that holds the contract), and (c)
the ability to exercise these rights for a certain period, often as long the company likes.
The last of these terms—governing the amount of time an artist is subject to the first
two—is perhaps the most important; all three terms remain of crucial importance in
the transition to the 360 deal as the industry’s new basic mode of talent contracting
(see Brereton, 2009).
The politics of the option contract are heightened with the problem of contract
duration because of the business context in which the option logic of contracting
norms developed. Companies have organized much of their business model around
their ability to sign un- or less-proven performers at low initial rates with the prospective outlook that some small proportion of them will “break” (industry jargon for an
artist’s achievement of popularity and profitability). New artists typically bargain from
very weak positions, but a minority of performers signed under these conditions generally does achieve or promise to achieve profitability. Because the long-term option
contract anchors artists to those initially unfavourable terms, it keeps their cost to the
company artificially low.2 The artist may be able to renegotiate certain terms once successes begin to mount, but they will not (under “exclusivity”) be able to test their
value on the open market, and thus any renegotiations are unlikely to achieve the
rates they could command from a new company anxious to exploit the performer’s
“buzz.” The second of the largely non-negotiable terms, “assignment,” covers the right
of the company holding the contract to sell it (typically along with the sale of the company) to a third party, who will likely be very interested in the ratio of the performer’s
cost to the company to the profits he or she can bring the company. “Duration” governs the length of time during which companies enjoy these rights and hence is part
of the value of the contract: A contract of a short duration with a successful artist is
typically of much less value to a company or a company’s prospective buyer than a
contract of long or potentially interminable duration. The duration set out in a contract
is usually one initial period (culminating in an album), typically followed by four to
six option periods (and sometimes “overcall” rights enabling the company to demand
yet more recordings in a period). Including the time taken to market the album and
performer (often as much as 18-24 months), and accounting for the company’s right
to refuse delivery of an album it does not want to market, the ultimate duration of a
successful artist’s contract can easily exceed 10 or 15 years (Gardner, 2006).
The importance of contract duration to the relationships between performers and
companies was intensified in the early 1980s, as the recording industry worked to rebuild profitability in the wake of a disastrous 1979-1980 global profit slump (Stahl,
forthcoming; Straw, 1990). The industry’s recovery was marked by an increasing reliance on smaller numbers of star performers generating a growing proportion of revenues. This “blockbuster” model was initially manifest in the staggering success of
Michael Jackson’s Thriller and then Bruce Springsteen’s Born in the USA (Eliot, 1993;
Garofalo, 1999). However, this model’s limitations were made immediately apparent
by a wave of U.S. artist unrest following the 1979 resolution of Olivia Newton-John’s
lawsuit against MCA Records (McLane & Wong, 1999; Stahl forthcoming). NewtonJohn’s suit had clarified the legal right of performers in California—a major hub of the
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global recording industry—to terminate their contracts at seven years. This outcome
heralded a weakness in the blockbuster model: What company would want to invest
in the development and promotion of a potentially blockbuster-status star only to see
that star enticed away by a competitor once his or her contract had expired? What investor or corporate board would want to buy into or buy a record company whose
most successful artists (those still under contract after several years) could bolt at the
peak of their profitability?
From 1985 to the early 2000s, the U.S. recording industry, acting through its trade
association, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), sought to tighten
its contractual grasp on economically successful and promising artists through efforts
to change state and federal law in the companies’ favour, and to resist changes to law
that would benefit artists. Played out before U.S. state and federal legislatures, these
contests concerned important details in labour, bankruptcy, and copyright law (Stahl,
2008, 2010, forthcoming). They dealt with the rights of recording artists to a statutory
limit on the duration of their contracts (decided in favour of companies in 1987), over
the right to seek bankruptcy protection in the same manner as all other Americans
(decided in favour of artists in 1998), over the terms on which companies may enjoin
artists from recording for other companies (companies, 1993), and over the copyright
status of sound recordings (artists, 2000). These encounters offer evidence of companies’ attempts to maximize their control over their contracted performers and the intellectual properties that result from their work, and of the strategies of performers
and their lawyers and unions to push back.
Assignment, exclusivity, and duration are generic contract terms, but the specifically
American evolution of the recording contract is of decisive significance to the Canadian
music industry. Richard Sutherland and Will Straw (2007) point out that “developments
and decisions made in other countries have important effects” (p. 142) on the Canadian
industry; the contracting norms of U.S.-based major record companies are reflected in
the practices of their Canadian branches. Moreover, Canadian artists seeking access to
the U.S.—“the largest market for Canadian music” (Sutherland & Straw 2007, p. 143)—
often do so through the U.S. major labels, thus encountering U.S. contracts directly. It is
on this terrain of control and contestation—shaped in the U.S. but influencing practices
beyond national borders—that the 360 deal makes its appearance, and it is against this
backdrop of patterned struggle that we ask: Who gets to control and appropriate what
under which circumstances? What conventions and parameters of control and appropriation are emerging as these deals become institutionalized?
While the widespread implementation of the 360 deal as industry standard reflects
a major shift in the record industry’s business model, such deals are not new in principle. Bruce Springsteen’s Mike Appel/Laurel Canyon contract, signed in 1972, secured
a “trio of deals for management, records, and music publishing” (Pierson, 2010, p. 33)
so that the company could
participate in streams of income other than sales of recorded music by virtue
of acquisition of music publishing rights and by a management commission
on additional revenue sources that would almost always include live performance, merchandising, and endorsement income. (p. 33)
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Nevertheless, the £80 million, six-album deal that Robbie Williams signed with EMI
in 2002—the richest music deal in British music industry history—is widely touted as
the first 360 deal (BBC News, 2002).
The groundbreaking Williams deal, which covers recording, live performance, film,
and television, provided early evidence that established superstars could be rewarded
handsomely for signing away rights to these other revenue streams. Notably, Williams
was able to secure a reversion of copyright clause guaranteeing the return of his masters at a future date (Salmon, 2007), an extraordinary achievement for a recording
artist of any stature (Stahl, 2008). Steve Greenfield and Guy Osborn (2007) characterize
the Williams contract as a “penthouse suite” deal, the likes of which “will only be available to the elite artists” (p. 5).
Williams signed this deal after having already achieved great success in the United
Kingdom, Australia, and a handful of European nations, appearing poised to break
into the U.S. market. He was therefore in a formidable bargaining position, which had
not been the case when he began his career at age 16 with Take That, a “boy band”
created by music manager Nigel Martin-Smith. Indeed, the distinction between the
“elite” and “boy band” 360 deal is instructive. Where the former represents the penthouse suite, the latter could be called a basement apartment deal, more akin to the
kind offered to the majority of (aspiring) recording artists (especially those who do
not compose their own material).
At the sub-basement apartment end of the 360 deal continuum is a particularly
alienating approach that gained traction in the 1990s: Lou Pearlman’s boy band contracts. Pearlman, creator of the Backstreet Boys and *NSync, is credited with developing
a contracting approach that involves coupling a traditional recording agreement with
an explicitly “employment-type” agreement.3 The “boys” received annual salaries in
exchange for assigning a percentage of merchandising, acting, licensing, and sponsorship revenues, in addition to recording, publishing, and live performance rights, to
Pearlman’s firm (LaPolt & Resnick, 2009). These deals serve as prototypes for contemporary boy band and girl group deals such as that of the Pussycat Dolls, an enterprise
owned by Robin Antin and Interscope Records that employs a rotating cast of singers.
In such deals, the firm often retains the power to dictate employee weight, hairstyle,
and so forth (LaPolt & Resnick 2009). While the Backstreet Boys and *NSync would
later successfully sue Pearlman for misrepresentation and fraud (Sanders, 2002), a
replicable contract template had been established.
Comprehensive and restrictive contracts have featured in the entertainment industry since the early days of the Hollywood studio system. In fact, Matt Fitz-Henry,
Walt Disney Records’ director of new media, points out that Disney “has been doing
that [360 deals] for 50 years” (Sandoval, 2008). Music industry talent contracts have
been late to the all-encompassing party. Disney Music Group (DMG) only began obtaining multiple rights from its recording artists in 2005, the year that the 360 deal became more than just a peripheral phenomenon (LaPolt & Resnick, 2009).
The 2005 contract binding the band Paramore to the record company Fueled By
Ramen, a Warner Music Group subsidiary, was widely commented on at the time and
appears now as an early example of the more standard 360 deal that lies somewhere
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between the penthouse and basement apartment deals (see Leeds, 2007). In addition
to obligating the band to record, Paramore’s contract deeded to the label shares in touring, merchandising, and fan club fees (Harding, 2009). A key theme in the positive
spin that coalesced around this deal was that it seemed to signal the apparent return
of the “artist development” model dethroned by the blockbuster. The paradigm case
of the artist development model is Bruce Springsteen, whose first albums were not
strong commercial successes, but who was supported by influential executives devoting resources to the cultivation of his audience and to his artistic development (see
Harden, 2010). According to Fueled By Ramen CEO John Janick, the executive who
signed Paramore,
[w]hen you have a strong infrastructure, like we do at Warner, and can be in
the ticket business, the merch business, the publishing business, then you
are doing a service for your artists. Their concerns aren’t all in silos anymore.
The label has put more on the line and invested more, and they have a bigger
incentive to really work on building a career. (Harding, 2009)
Yet this logic is not essentially different than that which has driven the recording
industry for decades: The incentive to invest in artists’ stardom has ever been the anticipated returns of its monetization and circulation in the market; risk minimization
has ever been the obverse of “artist development.” The transition to the blockbuster
model in the early 1980s was more of a shift of emphasis, toward the incorporation of
“comprehensive strategies of audience-building within the promotional itinerary specific to any individual album” (Straw 1990, p. 214, our emphasis) as opposed to the cultivation of fans for whom deeper interest in an artist would mean the purchase of back
catalogue as well as new releases. Today, indeed, “if a band’s first album is not a hit,
more often than not, that band is dropped” (Harden, 2010).
In 2006 a non-label player commenced the pursuit of revenue streams that traditionally fell outside its scope: live-performance oligopolist Live Nation. “Nu metal” band
Korn signed a multiple rights deal produced through an EMI-Live Nation joint venture,
an arrangement notable for “mak[ing] partners out of those who historically pursued
distinctly separate agendas” (Waddell, 2006). Live Nation’s 360 deals would dominate
the headlines for the following two years. In October 2007, Live Nation signed a 360
deal with Madonna that promised the pop star $120 million over ten years (Gallo, 2007)
and followed up with a $150 million, ten-year deal with rapper/producer Jay-Z (Leeds,
2008), a $70 million, ten-year deal with singer Shakira, and a $50-70 million deal with
the band Nickelback “for three albums and three touring cycles, with an option for a
fourth” (Gallo, 2008). As of 2010, however, Live Nation “[did] not expect to recoup
some of the advances it paid out to big-name artists. Investors were wary of those multirights deals,” and the company discontinued the practice (Peoples, 2010a). Five years
later, the first Live Nation record, Madonna’s MDNA, was released—on Interscope
Records (Halperin, 2011).
Thus, in less than a decade (arguably between 2002-2008), we have seen the introduction, expansion, and maturation of a new paradigm in music industry talent
contracting. While Live Nation may have cooled on 360 deals, the major record companies remain committed to such contracts. In November 2008, former Warner Music
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Group CEO Edgar Bronfman Jr. announced that all of Warner’s new artists would be
required to sign 360 deals (McCarthy, 2008), and in the years since, these multiple
rights contracts have become the industry standard.
This brief historical overview has highlighted a few notable high-profile contracts.
However, the 360 deal has the greatest impact on the vast majority of lesser known
recording artists whose contract negotiations receive little press. At one end of the continuum is a handful of superstars whose recorded music, touring, licensing/branding,
and merchandising businesses align well with the requirements of the blockbuster
model and who enjoy significant rewards. At the other end, the same basic framework
of a 360-degree blockbuster model is being applied to smaller scale artists, but the
math does not add up: Lower sales volumes of recordings, concerts, and merchandise,
coupled with less favourable contract terms, is a formula that promises to deepen disparities between the elite and the ranks of aspiring, increasingly disposable artists from
which new stars are expected eventually to appear.
360 deals are the new standard among majors and many independent record companies. Significantly, the scope of 360 deals even goes beyond activities traditionally
under the control of the artist—music publishing, touring, merchandising, and endorsements—to increasingly incorporate rights associated with artist websites and online stores, fan club websites, virtual ticketing services, mobile phone marketing
opportunities, video streaming services, photos, and other experiences offered to fans
(LaPolt & Resnick, 2009). “Usually,” writes Bart Day, “the label’s share of those nonrecord kinds of income is in the range of 10 to 20 percent, but for new artists it can get
as high as 50 percent” (Day, 2009). These deals take “passive” and “active” forms (Pierson, 2010). In the former, the artist is free to carry out or delegate to others non-recording activities while the company collects agreed-upon percentages of associated
revenues. In the latter, the company also exercises some degree of control over these
activities, often assigning them to the company’s own contractors or departments.
These non-record sources of income, formerly off-limits to companies in most recording contracts, used to provide an alternate means of support to the artist, enhancing
the artist’s independence and bargaining power vis-à-vis record companies. Record
companies “now want a slice” of artists’ “main source[s] of income” (Mitsopulos, 2008,
p. 62); attorneys urge artists to limit their vulnerability to companies’ participation in
contract negotiations. But as Craig Leach reports, “a 360 component is pretty much
mandatory” (Leach, 2010, p. 10) in new contracts in Canada as well as in the U.S. Of
the two main types, active deals are particularly common among new artists.
What do artists gain in exchange for giving up control of non-record activities and
incomes? As noted above, companies argue that their expanded participation adds incentive to market the acts concerned. In more concrete terms, early on in the institutionalization of the 360 deal, companies did pay and promise higher advances and
royalty rates in exchange for additional rights; that period “lasted for about 9 to 12
months” according to Donald Passman, U.S. entertainment attorney and author of a
respected music industry reference guide (Artists House Music, 2008). Canadian attorney Stacey Mitsopulos observed in 2008 that “some labels are offering a higher royalty share” in return for additional rights, “but this is not the norm so far” (2008, p. 62).
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However, companies soon realized that there was no business rationale to moderate
their longstanding “take it or leave it” approach to contracting with new or marginal
artists. Nor was contract duration affected: The 360 deal is the new form of the option
contract, which preserves for companies the exclusive right to determine when the
contract has been fulfilled and at what point an artist is free to entertain other offers
and sign with another company. With its expanded scope, the 360 version expands
the subordinating politics of the option contract.
Despite the proliferation of the 360 deal as the new normal, established artists
who have developed successful careers may be in a position to escape its reach. Some
artists, notably Radiohead and Nine Inch Nails, have been able to opt out of the traditional record label system in which they developed their acts and audiences and establish themselves as firms, typically with the aid of Internet-based distribution and
marketing. Radiohead has self-released two albums since parting ways with EMI; the
band’s “name your own price” digital download release of In Rainbows was followed
up by a digital release of The King of Limbs that fell in line with standard retail prices
(Billboard Pro, 2011). Trent Reznor of Nine Inch Nails started his own independent
record label in 2008 and has offered free digital downloads (Harding & Cohen, 2008).4
Through new media, according to Susan Kevorkian, digital music analyst with market
intelligence firm IDC, such acts may “reach their fans much more directly without
needing labels’ marketing expertise. But for emerging groups to leverage the same
technology to attract a following is a long row to hoe” (Sandoval, 2007). Despite the
devaluation of the recorded music commodity—i.e., the “track” or “album” as the
“unit” for retail sale—the record companies remain the most effective creators of markets and audiences for recording artists (see Sterne, 2011).
Independent record companies offer deals that resemble those of the majors, but
they also provide variations on this contractual theme. An alternative to the 360 deal
proposed by numerous independent record labels to new and established artists alike
is the “net profit deal.” These deals typically involve 50-50 sharing of net profits, which
appears quite fair at first glance. However, as Bart Day (2009) explains, “in most Net
Profit deals, the label doesn’t have to pay the artist anything (including, under many
contracts, even mechanical royalties) until the label has recouped all costs fronted by
the label”; that is, nothing else is paid until all advances and other monies paid to the
artist are recovered through profits. Day notes that “ten years ago, out of every ten
indie record deals I negotiated, only one or two were Net Profit Deals. Today it’s more
like six or seven out of every ten, at least” (Day, 2009).
An additional independent label approach involves allowing the artist to choose
to pay for particular services “ à la carte.” At the end of 2009, for instance, independent
label Cooking Vinyl introduced a “stripped-down service model” wherein the label
“claims no stakes in artist copyrights” (Ashton, 2010). The label’s deals with The Charlatans and Underworld involve exchanging label marketing and promotion efforts for
a share of artist sales revenue (Ashton, 2010).
Artist management companies, too, are emerging as options for artists seeking
exposure and marketing and who are interested in retaining their copyrights. For instance, ATC Management, a U.K. company, funds and tries to break artists in a manner
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similar to that of record companies. According to ATC Management founder Brian
Message, the company substitutes its “venture capitalist approach with artists” for the
traditional “copyright trading model” (Hunter-Tilney, 2010). The artist management
company’s operations purportedly “resemble a cottage industry, treating bands like
artisans and trying to find a niche for their products” (Hunter-Tilney, 2010).5 “Think
of it as Dragons’ Den with guitars,” suggests Hunter-Tilney, wherein “some young beat
combo pitch their wares (‘So, we’re kind of like The Smiths meet Funkadelic …’).”
Though not obliged to sign away control of copyrights, the artists who sign with ATC
are required to sign 360 deals that specify that “all income—from records, concerts,
merchandise, commercial tie-ins, everything—is split between band and backers, after
the initial investment has been repaid” (Hunter-Tilney, 2010). Far from a radical alternative to record label artist deals, then, ATC Management’s deals are simply examples
of “passive” 360 deals that require artists’ omnilateral exposure to companies’ ability
to appropriate income, their assumption of considerable risk, and their long-term obligation to investors/creditors.
Lastly, consumer brands have started to sign recording artists. Mountain Dew’s
Green Label Sound, Red Bull Music Academy, Diesel:U:Music, Converse Rubber Tracks,
and Scion Music Group, for instance, offer label, publishing, distribution, and/or recording studio services to emerging and unsigned talent. Such deals are typically quite
“hands-off,” and do not involve brand ownership of artist copyrights. However, there
is almost no security for artists in such arrangements, and the amounts of financial
support and investment appear quite small. For instance, at a 2011 North by Northeast
conference panel on consumer brands’ interest in recording artists, Adam Shore
stressed the cost advantage associated with working with recording artists whose fees
reflect a “tiny percentage” of a typical advertising budget (Shore, 2011). Many brands’
interest in the cost effectiveness of independent artists is also reflected in their approach to licensing music for use in commercials. According to one Canadian music
publisher, the advertising industry “has figured the trick out. … They’ll … say ‘Okay
guys, here’s your $500, off you go’ and the band is thrilled. They’re starving artists—
of course they’re thrilled” (J. Ferneyhough, personal communication, Toronto,
September 28, 2009). Artists here enter into agreements with companies for whom
the development of musical acts and the cultivation of musical audiences are sidelines,
activities liable to be abandoned as new trends or modes of brand marketing begin to
eclipse indie music.
A conceptualization of recording artists as “artist-brands” or, in the words of
Jordan Shur, CEO of Suretone Music, “lifestyle-driven bands” (Donahue, 2008),
undergirds the 360 deal. Articulated early on by Jeff Leeds in an oft-cited New York
Times article (Leeds, 2007), the notion of the artist-brand has since become axiomatic,
a music-industry truism, pushing older conceptions of the artist-company relationship
off the horizon. In this model, in which we see a significant reworking, intensification,
and ramification of existing cross-media models of celebrity (and which we intend to
treat at greater length in future work), the core music commodity is no longer the
recording, but instead is the artist persona. This is not to say that the recording has
vanished from the business model; rather, it is one facet of an artist-brand commodity
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bundle that also includes touring, publishing, and various sponsorship, licensing, and
endorsement agreements across television, film, advertising, and so forth—the very
revenue streams on which 360 deals capitalize.
The range of benefits and liabilities to artists turning their personae to account in
this fashion is broad. Lady Gaga’s 360 deal includes corporate partnerships with Polaroid,
Estée Lauder’s MAC, Virgin Mobile, and other mass-market brands; it has already generated nearly $200 million in revenue for Universal’s Interscope records (Roberts, 2011).
An artist marketed towards smaller niche audiences, such as reggaeton artist Ivy Queen,
may look forward to a very different suite of likely less-rewarding brand partnerships.
Ivy Queen entered into a 360 deal with Universal’s Latin music label, Machete, “a complete entertainment and lifestyle company” according to Machete president Walter
Kolm (Ben-Yehuda, 2010). Machete intends to launch a perfume line and a doll, and is
interested in exploring the possibility of book and clothing deals (Ben-Yehuda, 2010).
While Ivy Queen’s 2010 album Drama Queen achieved some success in the Billboard
Latin charts, the perfume and doll have yet to be released, and it remains to be seen
whether the application of a blockbuster merchandizing approach to a niche-specific
artist will be viable for the label or the artist. At the far end of the spectrum, the entertainment and lifestyle retailing activities of some indie artists involves an altogether different approach to merchandizing, outside the 360 contract: the online auctioning of
personal artifacts from the artists’ own homes, or the selling of lunch or mini-golf dates
(Kulash, 2010; Harding, 2010).
A crucial theme obtruding into the foreground here is the exacerbation of existing
patterns of stratification among aspiring and professional makers of popular music.
Some artists are better positioned to resist or reject expanding contractual demands,
some much less so. While we intend to focus explicitly on this very important development in future work, for now we would like to offer the following brief observations.
In the pre-360 model, the revenues garnered from superstars were used to recruit,
subsidize, and cultivate new artists, most of whom would be commercial failures.
Today, by way of the one-sided terms of new-artist 360 deals, record labels seem to
turn this logic on its head: They appear to be using their contracts with lesser-known
bands to absorb label risk and subsidize their still-high failure rates. Additionally, the
business model of the recording industry is founded on paying well below retail. Companies’ willingness to accept smaller profit margins on established stars is correlated
to demands for much greater margins on new or more marginal acts. This is manifested
as a dynamic polarizing logic in terms of artist advances (Mitsopulos, 2008), publishing
and licensing fees (Cardew, 2011), merchandizing (Seeking Alpha, 2010), and live
music’s increasingly “winner take all market,” in which superstars gain disproportionately over “mid-tier and up-and-coming artists” (Peoples, 2010b).

Conclusion
In the face of the devaluation of the recorded music commodity and the consequent
disintegration of a nearly century-old business model, the 360 deal plays a central role
in the re-securing of companies’ ability “to extract surplus value from musical labour”
(Keightley, 2010). The logic of the 360 deal’s part in this relation is dynamic: if an artist
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is getting paid for something, the label wants its percentage. As general manager of
RCA Records Tom Corson exclaimed, “we’ve woken up and said, ‘Hey, this isn’t fair.’ …
Record companies for years have funded the brand creation of artists and have only
benefited through record sales” (Knopper, 2007). These deals incorporate incomes
and activities that were not formerly covered in recording contracts, enlarging companies’ access to and participation in non-record markets including publishing, live music,
fan clubs, merchandizing, and so on. Indeed, the rights conferred in a 360 deal may
constitute “the sole livelihood for the artists who make the music for what may be the
duration of their career” (Pierson, 2010, p. 31), putting companies in ever-more formidable power positions. By securing to companies rights in artists’ non-record income
(in passive deals) and in non-record income and decision-making (in active deals),
the 360 deal increases artists’ vulnerability to and dependence on companies, though
the extent to which any particular artist’s freedom may be constrained in this way depends on the bargaining leverage they bring to contract negotiations. Some legal scholars go so far as to argue that the 360 deal poses a new frontier of “unconscionability”
in recording contracts (Anorga, 2002; Brereton, 2009; Gardner, 2006).
As companies large and small experiment with new models and revenue sources
(Leyshon, Webb, French, Thrift, & Crewe, 2005; Wikstrom, 2009), and as record stores
disappear from high streets, and limousines, private jets, underperforming artists, and
entire departments from corporate ledgers (Power & Mostrous, 2010; Jurgensen, 2010),
the contractual control of musical labour, property, and associated surplus remains a
primary imperative. As Bruce Carruthers and Arthur Stinchcombe (1999) observe, “organizational flexibility derives from a structure of rigidities” (p. 376). For the recently
rechristened “music companies,” long-term, exclusive, assignable, rigid, and now encompassing performer contracts (and the legal structures that underpin them) form a
(if not the) firm foundation upon which they may experiment with new operational
strategies. We argue that 360 deals extend and intensify existing patterns of control,
appropriation, and vulnerability long characteristic of record industry talent relations,
and that the institutionalization of these deals indicates growing stratification and
promises polarizing effects on recording artists’ social security and mobility.
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Notes
1. These activities are playing an expanding and consequential role in the marketing of music and of
performers’ personae; Meier (2011, forthcoming) takes them up in detail.
2. This model was proven by the Hollywood studio system, as the facts evident in Bette Davis’ and
Olivia De Havilland’s contractual lawsuits with Warner Bros. Pictures reveal (Greenfield & Osborn,
1998; Stahl, 2011)
3. The legal status of the artist-company relationship in the U.S. and Canada is beyond the scope of
this article.
4. Even superstar Robbie Williams has threatened to withdraw from his record deal in the wake of
EMI’s expressed intentions to cut between 1,500 and 2,000 jobs: “Artists are concerned that the record
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label wants to take a larger share of money made from concerts and merchandise, while cutting the
marketing budget” (BBC News, 2008).
5. The use of the term “artisan” here is quite interesting. The artisan’s status is that of an independently
contracting vendor of finished goods; the contracting company that retains any rights beyond those
that concern the immediate fate of a particular recording undermines the independent “artisan” status
of an artist.

References
Anorga, Omar. (2002). Music contracts have musicians playing in the key of unconscionability.
Whittier Law Review, 24, 739–773.
Artists House Music. (2008). AIMP forum on 360 deals: full session. URL: http://www.artistshousemusic.org/videos/aimp+forum+on+360+deals+full+session [August 15, 2011].
Ashton, Robert. (2010, June 21). Cooking Vinyl serves up appealing dish for artists. Music Week. URL:
http://www.musicweek.com/story.asp?sectioncode=1&storycode=1041590 [August 20, 2011].
BBC News. (2002, October 2). Robbie signs ‘£80m’ deal. BBC News: World Edition. URL:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/2291605.stm [March 29, 2011].
BBC News. (2008, January 15). EMI set to cut up to 2,000 jobs. BBC News: Business. URL:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7188898.stm [July 11, 2011].
Ben-Yehuda, Ayala. (2010, July 25). Ivy Queen Brings the ‘Drama’, Eyes Timbaland, Ne-Yo Collaborations. Billboard. URL: http://www.billboard.com/news/ivy-queen-brings-the-drama-eyestimbaland-1004106009.story#/news/ivy-queen-brings-the-drama-eyes-timbaland-1004106
009.story [August 20, 2011].
Billboard. (2009, December 19). The decade in music: Business trends – top 10 trends of the decade.
Billboard.biz. URL: http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/others/the-decade-in-music-top-10trends-of-the-1004052783.story [January 25, 2011].
Billboard Pro. (2011, February 22). Fan-set pricing: How’s that going? Billboard Pro. URL:
http://pro.billboard.com/content/fan-set-pricing-hows-going [August 18, 2011].
Blaufarb, Jonathan. (1983-1984). The seven year itch: California Labor Code section 2855. Communication/Entertainment Law Journal, 6(3), 653–693.
Brennan, Matt. (2010). Constructing a rough account of British concert promotion history. IASPM
Journal, 1(1), 4–13.
Brereton, Ian. (2009). The beginning of a new age? The unconscionability of the ‘360-degree’ deal.
Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, 27(1), 167–197.
Cardew, Ben. (2011, January 24). Sync fees falling says Glee’s music man. Musicweek.com. URL: http://
www.musicweek.com/story.asp?storyCode=1044002&sectioncode=1 [August 2, 2011].
Carruthers, Bruce & Stinchcombe, Arthur.(1999). The social structure of liquidity: Flexibility, markets, and states. Theory and Society, 28(3), 353–382.
Chapple, Steve & Garofalo, Reebee. (1977). Rock ‘N’ Roll is here to pay. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
Day, Bart. (2009, October). Net profit deals: A recent alternative to the traditional record deal. Music
Biz Academy.com. URL: http://www.musicbizacademy.com/articles/netprofitdeals1.htm
[March 26, 2011].
Donahue, Ann. (2008, March 8). The Billboard Q&A: Jordan Schur. Billboard. URL: www.billboard
.biz/bbiz/others/the-billboard-q-a-jordan-schur-1003717700.story [August 20, 2011].
Eliot, Marc. (1993). Rockonomics: The money behind the music. New York: Carol Publishing Group.
Frith, Simon. (1987). The Industrialization of popular music. In J. Lull (Ed.), Popular Music and Communication (pp. 49–74). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Gaines, Jane. (1991). Contested culture: The image, the voice, and the law. Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press.
Gallo, Phil. (2007, October 16). Madonna Partners with Live Nation. Daily Variety. URL: http://
www.variety.com/article/VR1117974128?refCatId=10&query=gallo+madonna+live+nation
[August 20, 2011]

456

Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 37 (3)

Gallo, Phil. (2008, July 8). Live Nation banks on Nickelback. Daily Variety. URL: http://
www.variety.com/article/VR1117988629?refCatId=16&query=gallo+live+nation+2008
[August 20, 2011].
Gardner, Theresa C. (2006). Expanding the rights of recording artists: An argument to repeal Section
2855 (b) of the California Labor Code. Brooklyn Law Review, 72(2), 721–758.
Garofalo, Reebee. (1999). From music publishing to MP3: Music and industry in the twentieth century. American Music, 17(3), 318–354.
Greenfield, Steve & Osborn, Guy. (1998). Contract and control in the entertainment industry: Dancing
on the edge of heaven. Brookfield, VT.: Ashgate.
Greenfield, Steve & Osborn, G. (2007). Understanding commercial music contracts: The place of
contractual theory. Journal of Contract Law, 23, 1–21.
Halperin, Shirley. (2011, December 15). Madonna’s Interscope-Live Nation deal worth $40 million;
Album due out in March. Hollywood Reporter. URL: http://www.hollywoodreporter.com
/news/madonna-interscope-live-nation-deal-273943 [March 6, 2012].
Harden, Nathan. (2010, February 1). The generation that killed rock ’n roll. Huffington Post. URL:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-harden/the-generation-that-kille_b_444428.html?
[August 20, 2011].
Harding, Cortney. (2009, July 18). Paramore: Now, ‘More again. Billboard. URL: http://www
.billboard.biz/bbiz/others/paramore-now-more-again-1003992511.story [January 17, 2010].
Harding, Cortney. (2010). Amanda Palmer: Cult of personality. Billboard, August 14.
Harding, Cortney & Cohen, Jonathan. (2008, March 2). New Nine Inch Nails album hits the
web. Billboard.biz. URL: http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content_display/industry/news
/e3ie188ab48abcdb0497e8c7946dc3fd240 [August 18, 2011].
Holt, Fabian. (2010). The economy of live music in the digital age. European Journal of Cultural Studies,
(13)2, 243–261.
Hull, Geoff. (2004). The recording industry (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge.
Hunter-Tilney, Ludovic. (2010, September 10). The music industry’s new business model: Off the
record. Financial Times. URL: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/92d98d1c-bae9-11df-9e1d00144feab49a.html [December 12, 2010].
Jurgensen, John. (2010, March 2). Gaga’s appeal more than just image. The Australian, p. 15.
Keightley, Keir. (2010, March). Lounge durée, or: Whatever happened to rock? Paper presented at the
Cultural Studies Association (U.S.) annual conference, Berkeley, CA.
Klein, Bethany. (2009). As heard on TV: Popular music in advertising. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Knopper, Steve. (2007, November 29). Reinventing record deals. Rolling Stone. URL: http://archive
.rollingstone.com/Desktop#/20071129/13 [February 10, 2011].
Kulash, Damian. (2010, December 17). The new rock-star paradigm. Wall Street Journal (Eastern edition). URL: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703727804576017592259031
536.html [January 25, 2011].
Laing, Dave. (2009). World music and the global music industry: Flows, corporations and networks.
Collegium, (6), 14–33. URL: http://www.helsinki.fi/collegium/e-series/volumes/volume_6
/index.htm [August 27, 2011].
LaPolt, Dina & Resnick, Max. (2009). Multiple rights deals in the US: 360˚ and beyond. In Dina
Lapolt (Ed.), What you get and give up in today’s recording agreement (pp. 10-22). URL:
http://www.lommen.com/pdf/SXSW-2011/What-You-Get-and-Give-Up-in-Today-s-Recording-Agr.aspx [February 7, 2011].
Leach, Craig. (2010). Making your way around the 360 deal. Canadian Musician, 32(5), 10–11.
Leeds, Jeff. (2007, November 11). The new deal: Band as brand. New York Times, p. 1.
Leeds, Jeff. (2008, April 3). In rapper’s $150 million deal, a new model for ailing music business. New
York Times. URL: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A0CE4DF1E31F930
A35757C0A96E9C8B63&scp=1&sq=jeff%20leeds%20rapper%27s%20deal&st=cse [March
28, 2011].
Leyshon, Andrew, Webb, Peter, French, Shaun, Thrift, Nigel, & Crewe, Louise. (2005). On the reproduction of the musical economy after the Internet. Media, Culture & Society, 27(2), 177–209.

Stahl & Meier The 360 Contract in the Digitalizing Music Industry

457

McCarthy, Caroline. (2008, November 6). Warner’s Bronfman, MySpace’s DeWolfe talk music. CNET
News. URL: http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-10084715-36.html [March 29, 2011].
McLane, Ben & Wong, Venice. (1999). Practice tips: How recording artists have broken their contracts.
Los Angeles Lawyer, 22, 27–55.
Meier, Leslie M. (2011). Promotional ubiquitous musics: Recording artists, brands, and ‘rendering
authenticity.’ Popular Music and Society, 34(4), 399–415.
Meier, Leslie M. (Forthcoming). Promotional ubiquitous musics: New identities and emerging markets
in the digitalizing music industry. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Western
Ontario, London, ON.
Mitsopulos, Stacey. (2008). 360-degree deals. Canadian Musician, 30(3), 62.
Passman, Donald. (2006). All you need to know about the music business (6th ed.). New York: Free Press.
Pateman, Carole. (1985). The sexual contract. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Pateman, Carole. (2002). Self-ownership and property in the person: Democratization and a tale of
two concepts. Journal of Political Philosophy, 10(1), 20–53.
Peoples, Glenn. (2010a, May 10). TicketsNow, 360 deals a drag for Live Nation. Billboard.biz. URL:
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content_display/industry/news/e3i975b286fc2a9c455bae
67acc2d35bdd6 [March 25, 2011].
Peoples, Glenn. (2010b, July 10). The new D.I.Y. Billboard. URL: http://www.billboard.biz/bbiz/others/the-new-d-i-y-1004101965.story [November 20, 2010].
Pierson, Edward. (2010). Negotiating a 360 deal: Considerations on the promises and perils of a new
music business model. Entertainment and Sports Lawyer, 27(4), 1. URL: http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Forums/entsports/PublicDocuments/winter10.authcheckdam.pdf [January 22, 2011].
Power, Helen & Mostrous, Alexi. (2010, May 8). Queen quits and EMI won’t stop them now: Troubled
label needs instant £105m to survive. The Times (London) National Edition, p. 56.
Ripley, Kathleen. (2010, October). Moving to the beat: Digital media and changing tastes force publishers to fine-tune strategies. IBISWorld Industry Report 51223: Music Publishing in the US.
URL: http://www.ibisworld.com/industry/default.aspx?indid=1253 [May 7, 2011].
Roberts, Johnnie L. (2011, May 20). Lady Gaga’s 360 ways to save the music industry. MSN Entertainment Music News. URL: http://music.msn.com/music/article.aspx?news=648668 [August
20, 2011].
Salmon, Richard. (2007, April). Recording contracts explained: Our guide to contract terms, written
by an entertainment layer. Soundonsound.com. URL: http://www.soundonsound.com
/sos/apr07/articles/contracts.htm [August 20, 2011].
Sanders, Maria A. (2002). Singing machines: Boy bands and the struggle for artistic legitimacy. Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, 20, 525–587.
Sandoval, Greg. (2007, November 2). When rockers cut ties from labels. CNET News. http://news
.cnet.com/When-rockers-cut-ties-from-labels/2100-1027_3-6216704.html?tag=mncol;txt
[March 29, 2011].
Sandoval, Greg. (2008, June 10). Music industry woes not felt by Disney Records. CNET News. URL:
http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9965217-7.html?tag=mncol;txt [March 28, 2011].
Seeking Alpha. (2010, February 9). Warner Music Group F1Q10 (Qtr End 12/31/09) earnings call transcript. URL: http://seekingalpha.com/article/187591-warner-music-group-f1q10-qtr-end-1231-09-earnings-call-transcript [March 30, 2011].
Shore, Adam. (2011, June). Product of a label: Selling out? Hell no… We’re buying in! Conference
presentation at North by Northeast Interactive. Toronto, ON.
Stahl, Matt. (2008). Recording artists, work for hire, employment, and appropriation. SSRN working
paper. URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1288831 [August 27, 2011].
Stahl, Matt. (2010). Primitive accumulation, the social common, and the contractual lockdown of
recording artists at the threshold of digitalization. Ephemera: Theory & Politics In Organization, 10(3/4), 337–355.

458

Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 37 (3)

Stahl, Matt. (2011). Employee in a cage? Olivia De Havilland, Warner Bros. Pictures, and the ‘limiting
case’ of (star) employment. SSRN working paper. URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1877503 [August 27, 2011].
Stahl, Matt. (forthcoming). Unfree masters: Popular music and the politics of work. Durham, NC: Duke
University Press.
Statistics Canada. (2009). Sound recording and publishing service bulletin. Catalogue number
87F0008X. Ottawa, ON.
Sterne, Jonathan. (2011, February). Music and consumerism: A long view. Paper presented at the
Experience Music Project Conference, UCLA.
Straw, Will. (1990). Popular music as cultural commodity: The American recorded music industries
1976-1985. [Unpublished PhD dissertation]. Montréal, PQ: McGill University.
Sutherland, Richard & Straw, Will. (2007). The Canadian music industry at a crossroads. In D. Taras,
M. Bakardjieva & F. Pannekoek (Eds.), How Canadians communicate: Media, globalization,
and identity (pp. 141–165). Calgary, AB: University of Calgary Press.
Tschmuck, Peter. (2006). Creativity and innovation in the music industry. Dordecht, Germany: Springer.
Waddell, Ray. (2006, January 21). Korn is open for business. Billboard. URL: www.billboard.biz
/bbiz/others/korn-is-open-for-business-1001843774.story [March 29, 2011].
Wikstrom, Patrik. (2009). The music industry: Music in the cloud. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity.
Williamson, John & Cloonan, Martin. (2007). Rethinking the music industry. Popular Music, 22(6),
305–322.
Young, Kevin. (2006). Signing a record deal: Pointers from Canadian industry professionals (part 1).
Canadian Musician, 28(1), 42–46.

